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Abstract—While financially advantageous, outsourcing key steps, such as testing, to potentially untrusted Outsourced Assembly and
Test (OSAT) companies may pose a risk of compromising on-chip assets. Obfuscation of scan chains is a technique that hides the
actual scan data from the untrusted testers; logic inserted between the scan cells, driven by a secret key, hides the transformation
functions that map the scan-in stimulus (scan-out response) and the delivered scan pattern (captured response). While static scan
obfuscation utilizes the same secret key, and thus, the same secret transformation functions throughout the lifetime of the chip,
dynamic scan obfuscation updates the key periodically. In this paper, we propose ScanSAT: an attack that transforms a scan
obfuscated circuit to its logic-locked version and applies the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attack, thereby extracting the secret key.
We implement our attack, apply on representative scan obfuscation techniques, and show that ScanSAT can break both static and
dynamic scan obfuscation schemes with 100% success rate. Moreover, ScanSAT is effective even for large key sizes and in the
presence of scan compression.
Index Terms—Obfuscated Scan Chains, Scan Obfuscation, Scan Locking, SAT Attack, Logic Locking.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MORE and more design houses are going fabless dueto the ever increasing cost of Integrated Circuit (IC)
manufacturing. Even those who hold onto their fabrication
facilities are now outsourcing key steps such as testing to
OSAT facilities [2], [3]. Outsourcing the fabrication and test-
ing processes to potentially untrusted parties raises concerns
regarding IC piracy, reverse engineering, overproduction,
Intellectual Property (IP) rights violation, and hardware
Trojan insertion [2]. Among the Design-for-Trust (DfTr) solu-
tions developed to prevent such hardware security threats,
logic locking is a holistic solution for mitigating IC piracy,
Trojan insertion, and overproduction, as it provides protec-
tion throughout the IC supply chain.
1.1 Logic Obfuscation/Locking
Logic locking hides the functionality of the design via the
insertion of additional logic elements (key gates).1 The pur-
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1. Obfuscation, locking, and encryption have been used interchange-
ably in the literature. In this paper, we use the former two terms
interchangeably.
pose of adding key gates is to lock the circuit during the
untrusted phases of the design and manufacturing process.
These key gates are driven by key-bits (key inputs) that are
stored in a tamper-proof memory on the chip. A valid key
restores the correct functionality of the design, unlocking it.
Combinational logic locking inserts combinational key gates
such as XOR/XNORs [4], [5], or multiplexers (MUXes) [6],
[7] to lock a design. The true functionality of the locked
netlist/chip is dictated by the secret logic locking key, and is
thus protected with this key. This way, not only the design
IP is protected but also unauthorized use of the chips is
prevented. The foundry, OSAT, and the end-users are all
untrusted.
1.2 Scan Obfuscation/Locking
Scan-based Design-for-Test (DfT) structures are used in
manufacturing testing due to direct access to deeply em-
bedded logic, enhancing test quality. However, this type of
testing structures opens a side channel that can be utilized
to retrieve secret information stored on-chip from cryptosys-
tems [8], [9], [10]. These attacks, referred to as scan-based
attacks, exploit the scan-based test structure in order to steal
security critical assets.
In order to provide protection against scan-based attacks
as well as an untrusted OSAT company during the testing
and chip-configuration phases, a special instance of logic
locking, namely scan locking [7], [11], obfuscates the scan
chain(s) by inserting key-driven logic in between the Scan
Flip-Flops (SFFs). This way, the untrusted tester applies a
scan-in stimulus (or configuration data) that is different than
the pattern delivered into the scan chains; similarly, the
tester observes scan-out responses that are different than
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the captured responses. Both transformations–the one that
maps the inserted scan stimulus (or configuration data)
to the pattern delivered into the scan chains, and the one
that maps the captured response to the scan-out response–
depend on the secret key, and are thus secret. The promise
of scan locking is that so long as the key is kept secret, the
actual test/configuration data cannot be inferred from the
transformed (obfuscated) test/configuration data that the
untrusted party has access to. Scan locking also prevents
reverse engineering attempts that rely on the scan side
channel [12]. The OSAT and the end-users are untrusted,
while the foundry may or may not be trusted depending on
the threat and business models.
We would like to note that scan obfuscation refers to
any technique that uses a set of keys to obfuscate the scan-
in and scan-out data. Static scan obfuscation utilizes the
same secret key, and thus, the same secret transformation
functions throughout the lifetime of the chip [7], [13]; the
former technique inserts key-gates on the scan path, while
the latter one reorders scan chain fragments based on a
secret key. Dynamic scan obfuscation, on the other hand, up-
dates the key periodically; the transformation function may
be different for different test/configuration patterns [11].
VIm-Scan [14] and SSTKR [15] can be considered dynamic
obfuscation techniques that embed keys in test patterns,
while [11] can be viewed as a generalized version of VIm-
Scan and SSTKR techniques with the added flexibility of
test data manipulations (pattern deletion/reordering). Fur-
thermore, VIm-Scan and SSTKR are vulnerable to attacks
that operate on test data to identify the key bits from the
test patterns, and solve for the seed subsequently [11]; this
is not due to the weakness of these techniques, but rather
because of the strong threat model that scan locking (and
we) follows where the structural details about the design
are available to the attacker.
1.3 Design Flow
The design flow for an IC is demonstrated in Fig. 1; it shows
both logic locking and scan obfuscation. As the main focus
of this work is an attack on scan obfuscation, we show
logic locking in the design flow as an optional step; as
shown later, scan obfuscation in conjunction with a basic
logic locking scheme is still vulnerable to our attack. As the
design flow shows, the netlist changes for both logic and
scan locking can be done post-synthesis, while logic locking
can also be integrated at RT Level [16], [17]. Scan locking
enables a protocol where the designer loads the secret key
post-manufacturing on some secure memory. The designer
also generates the transformed (obfuscated) test data based
on the secret key and the original test/configuration pat-
terns. The transformed test data is provided to the OSAT
company, who performs the testing without knowing the
actual test patterns [7], [18]. Similarly, the designer provides
transformed configuration vectors that need to be delivered
through the scan chains; the OSAT company applies the
configuration vectors to customize each IC without being
able to infer the actual content (security-critical bit streams,
chip ID, etc.). Post-testing, the logic-locked chips that have
been identified to be defect-free are activated by loading the
secret logic locking key on the tamper-proof memory.2 The
chips are then unlocked, and thus, become functional.
1.4 The SAT attack
Logic and scan locking techniques are complementary de-
fenses that protect the design IP and the test interface,
respectively. A representative logic locking attack that aims
at extracting the secret key is the so-called SAT attack [19].
The threat model showing the attacker’s capabilities in the
case of the SAT attack is displayed in Fig. 2 (b). The attack
requires a locked netlist (obtained through reverse engineer-
ing a chip or the layout information) and a working chip
(obtained from the market) that is used as an oracle. The
SAT attack applies a SAT solver on the Conjunctive Normal
Form (CNF) representation of the locked netlist to produce a
Distinguishing Input Pattern (DIP), which is an input com-
bination for which at least two different key values generate
differing outputs. The attack then applies this pattern to the
working chip to obtain the correct response, which helps
prune all the incorrect keys that fail to produce this output
on the locked netlist. This process is repeated iteratively and
the generated input-output pairs are added to the gradually
growing CNF formulation. The attack succeeds when a DIP
can no longer be found by the SAT solver, which is when
the correct key is returned.
As the SAT attack broke all the logic locking techniques
existing then, new logic locking techniques are recently pro-
posed that are resilient to the attack. The new logic locking
techniques can thwart the SAT attack by increasing the
number of required DIPs exponentially. One recent solution
is the Stripped Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL) tech-
nique [20]. Yet, researchers are now developing functional
analysis based attacks that can break certain instances of the
SFLL technique [21], [22], [23].
What is common between the SAT attack and the scan-
based attacks is that in both cases a full scan access is
required. However, the threat model and the goal of the
attacks are different. The threat model assumed for scan-
based attacks is weaker than the one considered for the SAT
attack and is shown in Fig. 2 (a). The attacker is assumed
to have access to the scan-accessible IC with assets inside
(serial ID, crypto keys, IP details, etc.). The attacker can
switch between the functional and test modes and steal the
secret assets.
Though the primary objective of scan locking is to thwart
scan-based attacks that leak security-critical assets on chip,
scan locking can be considered to presumably protect logic
locking against SAT or other attacks as well.3 Most of the
logic locking attacks, including the powerful SAT attack,
assume full scan access to a working oracle. We note that
there are a few exceptions, such as [24], that launch the
attack without scan access; however, as explained further
later, the effectiveness of such techniques is quite limited
2. A chip need not be functional to be tested for structural de-
fects. Test generation and application can thus be performed based
on dummy logic locking keys. The flow therefore shows post-test
activation of chips, as this is the most secure strategy [18].
3. We acknowledge that not all prior work on scan obfuscation claim
such an objective. We carry out our security analysis in any case in
order to clearly outline the limitations of scan locking.
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Fig. 1. Design flow with logic and scan locking, and the proposed ScanSAT attack. OSC stands for Obfuscated Scan Chain. ATPG refers to
Automatic Test Pattern Generation.
Fig. 2. Threat models: (a) Scan-based attacks (b) SAT attack (c)
ScanSAT attack
and they don’t scale well. Scan locking thwarts the direct
application of logic locking attacks as shown in Fig. 1.
1.5 Contributions of This Work
Powerful attacks such as SAT or scan attacks cannot break
scan locking, as scan access is now controlled with a secret
key. This is also argued in [11], which presents a dynamic
scan locking solution that delivers protection against IP
design piracy throughout supply chain in the presence of
attacks such as the SAT attack. In fact, as stated earlier, scan
locking can be paired with logic locking to protect logic
locking from any attack that requires scan access (i.e., SAT
attack).
In this paper, we take on the challenge of breaking stat-
ically and dynamically obfuscated scan chains; we propose
ScanSAT attack. We use Encrypt Flip-Flop (EFF) [7] as a
representative example for static scan obfuscation and the
technique in [11] as a representative example for Dynami-
cally Obfuscated Scan (DOS), while we note that our attack
can be adapted for other variants of scan obfuscation as
well; we also show that we can break scan scrambling [13]
by adapting our ScanSAT modeling. The attack flow is
presented in Fig. 1 and the threat model is presented in Fig. 2
(c). Consistent with almost all attacks on logic locking, the
proposed attack requires (i) a working chip (with obfuscated
scan chain(s)) and (ii) a locked design netlist. ScanSAT
models the obfuscated scan chain as a logic locking problem,
and then launches the SAT attack on it. It creates the com-
binational circuit equivalent of the scan-obfuscated circuit;
this circuit is a logic-locked circuit with a key corresponding
to the secret transformations on the scan chain(s). We then
apply the SAT attack on this logic circuit model to extract
the key; only then the SAT attack works successfully, simply
because basic scan locking techniques do not account for the
SAT attack when they embed transformations on the scan
path.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We show that our modeling can turn seemingly com-
plex scan transformations into just another layer of
breakable structures, helping break a unified scan and
logic locking framework seamlessly. As opposed to
regular combinational logic obfuscation, which is a 1-
cycle transformation that depends on a key, scan obfus-
cation is an n-cycle transformation as scan operations
are performed over n cycles (n is the scan depth).
Scan obfuscation techniques have thus far relied on
this difference in mitigating SAT attacks, which only
apply to 1-cycle transformations. We show in this paper
an attack that can handle an n-cycle transformation
through a proper modeling and turn it into a 1-cycle
transformation.
• One important, yet counter-intuitive, finding is that
simple static/dynamic scan locking falls short of pro-
tecting the scan access, and thus cannot be relied on in
thwarting powerful attacks that need scan access to an
oracle.
• We propose a novel attack ScanSAT that can break
static and dynamic scan locking by extracting the scan
locking key within a few iterations and a 100% success
rate.
• We show that ScanSAT is effective even for large key
sizes and in the presence of on-chip scan compression.
• We show that ScanSAT can also break a two-layered
defense where scan locking is coupled with a SAT-
attack-vulnerable logic locking technique; we show that
scan locking fails to protect logic locking against the
SAT attack. A SAT attack resilient logic locking solution
is still required to protect the design IP.
ScanSAT has not been designed to be effective on other
protection solutions that are outside of the scan obfusca-
tion category; naturally, ScanSAT cannot break them. These
defenses are partial scan, scan pin defusion, and those
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that involve test mode control and scan chain masking,
such as the Design-for-Security (DFS) architecture proposed
in [25], which recently got broken by a custom attack to be
presented in ICCAD 2019.
2 STATIC SCAN OBFUSCATION
2.1 Idea and Implementation
The idea is to obfuscate the scan path via secret inversions;
this way, the patterns delivered to the scan chain(s) differ
from the scan-in stimulus in a secret manner. In addition, the
captured response differs from the scan-out pattern that is
observed through the Scan-out pin(s). A secret key dictates
these inversion operations on the scan path, and thus, the
exact relationship between: (i) the scan-in and delivered
patterns and (ii) the captured and scan-out patterns.
Secret inversions can be inserted into the scan chains
by inserting XOR gates (in alternative implementations,
MUXes) between selected scan cells. An XOR gate driven
by a key-bit of 1 implements an inversion. A designer can
insert k XOR gates, resulting in a k-bit key; some of these
k XORs implement inversion on the scan chain. Although a
reverse engineer can identify the locations of these gates on
the scan path, only the designer knows the key, and thus,
the subset of gates that perform an inversion operation.
To create a search space for the attacker that is expo-
nential in the size of the key, naive scan obfuscation can
initially embed scan inversions in selected locations, some
of which are canceled by XORs driven by a key-bit of 1; this
way, the attacker cannot make any deductions about the key
value from the location of the XOR gates. All commercial
Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tools are able
to handle scan inversions; the designer with the secret key
information can perform test generation in the presence of
these inversions.
2.2 Obfuscated Scan Chain Example
An example obfuscated scan chain is presented in Fig. 3 for
the circuit s386 from the ISCAS-89 benchmark suite [26].
Three key-bits k0, k1, and k2 obfuscate the scan operations.
The scan-in pattern applied from the Scan-in pin is denoted
by a, where ai is the bit intended for SFFi.
In this example, let’s assume that the secret key is 111
and thus all three XORs insert inversion in a secret fashion.
The pattern delivered into the scan cells upon the comple-
tion of six shift cycles is denoted by a
′
, where a
′
i is the bit
delivered into SFFi. Due to the inversions introduced by
the locking XORs, a 6= a′ . In this example, SFF2, SFF3, and
SFF5 receive their stimuli inverted due to an odd number
of inversions between the Scan-in pin and these flip-flops,
while SFF0, SFF1, and SFF4 receive their stimuli as is
due to an even number of inversions.
During the capture operation, a
′
is applied to the com-
binational circuit rather than a. After the capture cycle,
the SFFs will capture their corresponding functional in-
puts (response of the combinational circuit) denoted by b
′
.
However, the same locking XORs apply inversions on the
response bits as well; the pattern observed through the Scan-
out pin is denoted as b, where bi corresponds to SFFi. Due
to the inversions introduced by the locking XORs, b 6= b′ . In
this example where all XORs insert inversion, the captured
response bits in SFF2, SFF3, and SFF5 are observed as is
(even number of inversions from the flip-flop to the Scan-
out pin), while response bits in SFF0, SFF1, and SFF4 are
inverted prior to being observed through the Scan-out pin
(odd number of inversions). A test generation (ATPG) tool
with the knowledge of the secret key would be aware of the
scan inversions, thus producing transformed stimuli a and
responses b automatically.
2.3 Security Claims
The ever-assumed equivalence of scanned-in to delivered
stimuli and captured to observed responses is broken by
scan locking in a secret manner; a 6= a′ and b 6= b′ . The
secret key dictates the transformation from a to a
′
and the
one from b to b
′
. An untrusted party is able to use a and b
to test chips through the scan interface, yet without being
able to infer the security-critical data a
′
and b
′
, effectively
thwarting attacks that rely on scan access.
Simple scan-flush attempts by an attacker where special
patterns such as all 0’s or all 1’s are shifted through scan
chain(s) with no capture operation, reveal very limited in-
formation about the secret inversions on the scan path. Such
attempts only reveal whether the total number of inversions
between the Scan-in pin and the Scan-out pin of the entire
chain(s) is even or odd. Where exactly on the scan chain(s)
these inversions take place remains to be a mystery for the
attacker.
2.4 Scan Chain Scrambling
Another way to transform scan data is through scan chain
scrambling, in which the order of SFFs in the scan chains
is hidden and controlled by a secret key [13]. In scan chain
scrambling, the scanned-in/scanned-out data is permuted.
In order to scramble the scan chains, MUXes are added
between selected SFFs, where the scan input of the selected
SFFj,i (located on scan chain j, scan slice i) is fed by the
output of a MUX. The inputs to the MUX can come from
any two (or more) SFFs from the (i − 1)th scan slice. The
select lines of the newly added MUXes are secret key-bits
that control the ordering of scan path fragments.
Figure 4 presents an example of scan chain scrambling
implementation. Six MUXes are added between the scan
elements. The three bolded lines in blue, green and red
demonstrate the three correct scan paths; the correct key is
101110. Without the knowledge of the secret key, the correct
scan path is hidden from the attacker. Therefore, the end
goal of scan obfuscation is achieved; scan data is secretly
transformed (permuted, in this case).
2.5 SAT Attack on Static Scan Obfuscation
We locked the s27 circuit from the ISCAS-89 benchmark
suite [26], containing three flip-flops, by using three key-
gates as shown in Fig. 5 (a). Since s27 is a sequential circuit,
the inputs (a0, a1, and a2) and outputs (b0, b1, and b2)
of the FFs are turned into Pseudo Primary Inputs (PPI)s
and Pseudo Primary Outputs (PPO)s. We then ran the SAT
attack; it was successful in retrieving the secret key value,
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Fig. 3. Scan obfuscation on the s386 benchmark; three key-bits obfuscate the scan operations.
Fig. 4. Scan chain scrambling implementation; six key-bits obfuscate the
scan path. The correct key is 101110 and the correct (secret) scan paths
are colored in blue, green and red.
Fig. 5. (a) The s27 benchmark locked using XOR/XNOR gates; three
key-bits k0 −→ k2 lock the combinational circuit. The correct key is
101. The inputs/outputs of the flip flops are converted into PPIs/PPOs
marked in red. (b) Adding scan obfuscation as an additional layer.
Scan obfuscation blocks the access to the scan chain and thus the
inputs/outputs of the flip flops are no longer accessible.
as the attack was able to handle the 1-cycle transformation
implemented by logic locking.
The existing static scan locking techniques are claimed
to be resilient against the SAT attack due to blockage of the
scan access. To verify this claim, we added scan obfuscation
as an additional security layer as shown in Fig. 5 (b). Two
additional key-bits obfuscate the scan operations with the
pattern (1, 0) for the three-bit scan chain. The SAT attack
assumes a full access to the scan chain, therefore the scan
obfuscation is ignored and the locked circuit’s netlist is
assumed to be the one displayed in Fig. 5 (a). The goal of the
SAT attack is to identify the logic locking key. Yet the SAT
attack fails to obtain the correct key, since upon applying the
obfuscated responses as constraints, all possible key values
were eliminated from the search space. The SAT attack
was thus unsuccessful against the 3-cycle transformation
implemented by static scan obfuscation and the SAT
solver returned an UNSAT.
3 DYNAMIC SCAN OBFUSCATION
3.1 Idea and Implementation
Similar to static scan obfuscation, dynamic scan obfusca-
tion inserts secret inversions as well, obfuscating the scan
path. However, in this case, the obfuscation key changes
over time; specifically in [11], the obfuscation key changes
with a key update frequency p. As a result, the test data
transformation functions change over time, resulting in a
stronger defense. From the attacker’s perspective, there is
now a sequence of keys to extract as opposed to a single
key.
A Dynamically Obfuscated Scan (DOS) architecture was
proposed in [11]. The structure consists of (i) a Linear-
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) (ii) a shadow scan chain, and
(iii) a control unit. This DOS structure is highlighted in grey
rectangle in Fig. 6.
The LFSR is used in order to generate a λ-bit obfuscation
key where λ is the maximum length of a scan chain. The
LFSR operation is driven by the control unit and it will
change its output when a key update signal is received.
The shadow scan chain consists of λ flip-flops and it
takes in the λ-bit obfuscation key generated by the LFSR.
The outputs of the chain are [x × λ × α]-bits, where x is
the number of scan chains in the DfT structure and α is the
permutation percentage (the percentage of SFFs selected to
be locked in each scan chain). The purpose of the shadow
scan chain is to prevent reset/flush attacks that assume that
all scan cells are reset upon power-up. Therefore, it aims
to protect the obfuscation key from being leaked. Shadow
chain makes sure that all 0’s are read out from the Scan-out
pin(s) during the shift-in of the first pattern after power-up.
Once the scan chain(s) are filled with the first pattern, the
shadow chain has no purpose.
The control unit consists of an n-bit register, an n-bit
counter, and a control flip-flop. Upon startup, a secret con-
trol vector is loaded from a protected memory. The control
vector consists of the λ-bit secret seed to be loaded into the
LFSR, the p value representing the key update frequency,
and the maximum allowable number of key updates. This
secret information is chosen by the designer.
When scan operation is enabled, the n-bit counter incre-
ments with each capture pulse. Once p value is reached, a
key update signal is generated, causing the LFSR to change
its output and the counter to reset.
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Fig. 6. Dynamic scan obfuscation on the s386 benchmark; λ = 3, x = 2
and α = 2/3 [11].
3.2 Dynamic Scan Obfuscation Example
The s386 circuit is obfuscated using the DOS technique as
shown in Fig. 6. The key size in this example is λ = 3,
and thus, a three-bit LFSR is utilized. Upon startup, the
key update frequency p, the secret three-bit seed, and the
maximum allowable number of key updates will be read
from memory. A compression structure is present in this
example comprising a fanout stimulus decompressor (high-
lighted in green dotted rectangle) and an XOR response
compactor (highlighted in red dotted rectangle). The six
SFFs available in the design are divided into two scan
chains, i.e., x = 2. Four XOR gates in total are inserted in
the scan chains in order to provide scan locking similar to
static scan obfuscation. The difference here is that the three-
bit key (k0, k1, k2) changes over time based on an update
frequency p.
3.3 Security Claims
Dynamic scan obfuscation promises all the security guar-
antees (resilience to scan flush and mode-reset attempts,
no key inference from XOR locations, etc.) of static scan
obfuscation. In addition, resetting attacks will not work due
to the utilization of the shadow scan chain which protects
the obfuscation key during a global reset. The shadow scan
chain also protects from differential attacks [27], as the
first scan-out pattern is all 0’s. Furthermore, as the key is
updated periodically, there is a limited time window for any
attack to retrieve a key before it is updated.
4 SCANSAT ON STATIC SCAN OBFUSCATION
In this section, we present the ScanSAT attack on static scan
obfuscation techniques. ScanSAT is based on the insight
that the complex n-cycle transformation of scan locking
can be modeled by generating a combinational (1-cycle
transformation) equivalent of the scan-obfuscated circuit.
The obfuscation inversions on the scan path become part
of the resultant combinational circuit, which effectively is a
logic-locked circuit with key logic inserted at the pseudo-
primary inputs/outputs of the circuit. The logic-locked
circuit equivalent of a generic scan-obfuscated circuit in
Fig. 7(a) is provided in Fig. 7(b), where the obfuscation
on the stimulus and the response are modeled separately
Fig. 7. (a) Obfuscated scan chain. (b) Modeling the obfuscated scan
chain(s) using ScanSAT.
as combinational blocks driven by the same scan obfus-
cation key. The resultant circuit can now be attacked via
traditional logic locking attack techniques, such as the SAT
attack developed by Subramanyan et al. [19] or the test-data
mining attack formulation developed by Yasin et al. [18].
Breaking the logic-locked circuit and extracting its key is
equivalent to breaking basic scan obfuscation and deobfus-
cating/unlocking the scan chain(s).
The proposed ScanSAT modeling is also capable of ac-
counting for any additional logic locking technique applied
in conjunction to scan obfuscation; the circuit in Fig. 7(b)
allows for the incorporation of another logic locking tech-
nique (with a separate key) applied on the combinational
circuit. In that case, the resultant logic-locked circuit that
models two layers of defenses can then be attacked via the
SAT attack, extracting both keys simultaneously. We revisit
this point in section 7.5.
4.1 ScanSAT on Key-gate Insertion Based Obfuscation
ScanSAT comprises two basic stages: (i) modeling the obfus-
cated scan chain as a logic locking problem and (ii) breaking
the obtained modeled circuit using attacks on logic locking.
The first step is the formulation of the relationship
between scan-in pattern a and the pattern delivered into
the scan chain(s) a
′
. Some of the bits in a
′
are identical to
the corresponding bits in a while the remaining ones are
complementary to the corresponding bits in a. The secret
key value k dictates the exact relationship; the bits that pass
through an even number of inversions are delivered intact,
while those that pass through an odd number of inversions
between the Scan-in pin and the target scan cell are inverted.
In the example in Fig. 3, the following equations capture the
relationship between a and a
′
:
a
′
i = ai ⊕ L(k, i) (1)
where L(k, i) is XOR of all the key bits of key k that are
injected into a location between the Scan-in pin and scan
cell i. Without knowing the value of k, the attacker cannot
tell which stimulus bit is delivered intact and which one is
inverted.
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Fig. 8. Modeling the obfuscated scan chain(s) as a logic locking problem.
A capture operation produces the response b
′
upon
applying the scan chain(s) content a
′
to the combinational
circuit. The other obfuscation layer consists of the unknown
number of inversions each captured response bit passes
through prior to being observed on the Scan-out pin. Again,
the values of k dictate these secret inversions. The rela-
tionship between the captured response pattern b
′
and the
observed scan-out pattern b can be formulated similarly as
follows:
bi = b
′
i ⊕R(k, i) (2)
where R(k, i) is XOR of all the key bits of key k that are
injected into a location between the scan cell i and the
Scan-out pin. The equations above can be easily modeled
as additional XOR logic around the combinational circuit,
relating a
′
to a and b to b
′
as a function of the secret key k.
For the same example, the modeled circuit is shown in Fig. 8.
This modeled circuit captures the transformation of inserted
scan-in pattern a to the pattern delivered in scan chain(s) a
′
,
which is applied through the pseudo primary inputs of the
combinational circuit. It also captures the transformation of
the captured response pattern b
′
to the scan-out pattern b.
On the input side, the same key-bit/gate appears multiple
times as it affects all the flip-flops to its right on the scan
path. Similarly, on the output side, the same key-bit/gate
appears multiple times as it affects all the flip-flops to its
left on the scan path. This modeling can also be conceived
as unrolling of the scan operations.
The final modeled circuit in Fig. 8 is simply a logic-
locked circuit that has three key-bits. An attacker can use
this modeled circuit along with the scan-obfuscated oracle to
identify the secret key k. For this, the attacker runs the SAT
attack [19] on this modeled circuit, generating (obfuscated)
input-output patterns. The input patterns a are those the
attacker then applies from the Scan-in pin of a working chip.
The output patterns b are those the attacker collects from the
Scan-out pin of the working chip. By iteratively generating
the input-output patterns, the attacker gradually prunes the
key search space, and produces the secret key k of the logic-
Fig. 9. (a) Scan chain scrambling; three key-bits are used. (b) Modeling
as a logic locking problem.
locked circuit, which is also the key used to obfuscate the
scan chains.
4.2 ScanSAT on Scan Chain Scrambling
In this section, we explain how ScanSAT can be adapted
to break scan chain scrambling; the ScanSAT modeling is
tweaked to account for the scrambled scan operations. In
the case of scan chain scrambling, multiplexer logic that
captures the scan chain reordering operations becomes part
of the modeled combinational circuit. The first step in gen-
erating the logic-locked circuit equivalent is the formulation
of the relationship between the scanned-in pattern a and the
pattern delivered into the scan chain(s) a
′
. Next is the for-
mulation of the relationship between the captured response
b
′
and the scanned-out pattern b. The same scrambling key
affects both the stimulus and response transformations.
The difference between key insertion based scan obfus-
cation and scan scrambling is that in the latter case, the
transformations between a and a
′
and between b
′
and b
are not one-to-one mappings. The bit delivered into SFFi,j
(SFF located on scan chain j, scan slice i) can come from
any Scan-inj input and the captured bit can pass through
any Scan-outj output, depending on the secret key and
the location of the MUXes. The scrambling implementation
example using three key-bits shown in Fig. 9 (a) is modeled
for attack in the form of the logic-locked circuit in Fig. 9 (b).
SAT attack is executed on Fig. 9 (b) to retrieve the secret
key, which reveals the secret shuffling of the scan chain
fragments.
5 SCANSAT ON DYNAMIC SCAN OBFUSCATION
Next, we discuss how ScanSAT can be extended in order
to break dynamic scan obfuscation. As explained earlier,
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dynamic scan obfuscation uses a sequence of keys generated
by an LFSR based on a secret seed and a key update
frequency p, which is also a secret. The fact that the keys
change in every p patterns necessitates a radically different
approach than simply modeling the scan transformations
and running the SAT attack, which worked well for static
scan locking as we have shown, but falls short in breaking
dynamic scan locking. SAT attack has been developed for
logic locking defenses that depend on a static key that
remains constant throughout the lifetime of a chip; an at-
tack that extracts dynamic keys is missing in logic locking
literature.
While the seed and p are secret, both the LFSR structure
(from the reverse-engineered netlist) and its polynomial are
available to the attacker. The first objective of ScanSAT is to
identify the value of p. This value is then used to identify
the secret seed. From the secret seed and p, the attacker
can derive all the keys that are dynamically generated on-
chip. ScanSAT on dynamic scan obfuscation comprises the
following steps.
5.1 Step 1 - Identify the key update frequency p
A simple approach to identify p is to apply the same
stimulus pattern Stim repeatedly from the Scan-in pins, and
observe the response Resp through the Scan-out pins; Stim
transforms into Stim′, which is applied to the combina-
tional logic, and the captured response Resp′ is transformed
into Resp. Upon p capture operations, the key is updated.
From that point on, when the same Stim is applied, it is now
transformed to Stim′′ and applied to the combinational
circuit; the captured response is Resp′′. Resp′′ now goes
through a different transformation than Resp′ because of
the new key; therefore, most likely, there will be a notice-
able change in the observed response, helping detect the
obfuscation key update operation:
Respj = R(C(L(Stim, kj)), kj) (3)
In the equation above, L() and R() are the linear trans-
formation operations that the stimulus and the response,
respectively, go through due to scan obfuscation with the jth
dynamic key kj ; these operations were already defined in
the previous section. C() is the function implemented by the
combinational logic. Even though the same stimulus Stim
is applied, the jth response Respj (with dynamic key kj
active) will likely be different from Respj−1 (with dynamic
key kj−1 active), as kj is different from kj−1.
Challenge: It is theoretically possible, though unlikely,
that Respj and Respj−1 are identical. This happens when
the stimulus transformation L(), the capture operation
through the combinational logic function C(), and the re-
sponse transformation R() collectively produce identical
responses even for two different keys kj and kj−1. This is
possible because although L() and R() are linear functions,
C() is not. In this highly unlikely scenario, the key update
operation would go unnoticed.
Solution: A simple remedy is to repeat the same process
with different stimulus patterns. The smallest one of the
identified values of p can be considered as the actual p. The
more stimulus patterns used in the process, the higher the
Fig. 10. (a) LFSR structure, (b) equations that relate the first two four-bit
keys kij to the seed Xi, and (c) Seed-to-key block for the first two keys.
Fig. 11. ScanSAT modeling to compute the seed.
confidence level. In our experiments, we never encountered
this unlikely scenario.
5.2 Step 2 - Extract the secret seed
As opposed to the static scan locking case, we can’t run the
SAT attack the same way, as a key remains valid for only
p patterns. The SAT attack normally generates all the DIPs
aiming for one static key, which is no longer the case in
dynamic scan locking. From Step 1, we now know p, and
thus, the number of patterns for which a key remains valid.
Similar to the ScanSAT on static scan locking, we model
the L() and the R() functions in the form of XOR circuitry
inserted around the combinational logic for dynamic scan
locking as well. The difference now is that the SAT attack
can be executed for at most p patterns, which defines the
time window for which each dynamic key remains valid. If
more than p DIPs are required to identify a dynamic key,
the SAT attack needs to be terminated prematurely upon p
DIPs. Another SAT attack can be executed subsequently to
identify the next dynamic key in the sequence; this attack
too will have to be terminated upon p DIPs. The question
is how to combine all the information obtained from these
prematurely terminated independent SAT attack runs in
identifying the secret seed.
All the dynamic keys are generated from one secret
seed based on the LFSR structure (primitive polynomial).
A set of linear equations, known to the attacker, define
the relationship between the secret seed and each dynamic
key kj . The example in Fig. 10 shows the linear equations
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Fig. 12. Iterative execution of ScanSAT on dynamic scan locking by
using independent SAT attack runs.
mapping the four-bit seed to the first two four-bit dynamic
keys generated from this seed. Although the independent
SAT attack runs aim for identifying the dynamic keys,
they in fact reveal information about the seed every time
a dynamic key becomes partially known. It is possible to
combine information from independent SAT attack runs by
gradually gathering information about the seed in every
run.
We can therefore incorporate into our ScanSAT model
the relationship between the seed and the keys. As shown
in Fig. 10, an LFSR can also be modeled as a combinational
block consisting of XOR gates; we refer to this block as the
seed-to-key block. We append an instance of this block into
the logic-locked circuit equivalent of scan-obfuscated design
as in Fig. 11, forcing ScanSAT to solve directly for the seed.
However, when the SAT attack is terminated upon p DIPs
prematurely, the seed is resolved only partially. Fortunately,
SAT attack run prematurely terminates with a Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF) formula that captures the information
on the partially resolved seed thus far, which can be carried
over to the next SAT attack run (with the next dynamic
key in the sequence). During the next SAT attack run, the
seed-to-key block needs to be updated based on the linear
equations that define the relationship between the seed
and the new dynamic key, and the new SAT attack run is
executed by starting with the CNF from the previous run(s).
a
′
i = ai ⊕ L(S(seed, j), i) (4)
bi = b
′
i ⊕R(S(seed, j), i) (5)
The CNF of the jth SAT attack run CNFj is formed
by running the SAT attack for up to p DIPs based on
the modeling captured by the equations above; ai, bi, a
′
i,
and b
′
i were already defined for ScanSAT on static scan
locking. S() function is implemented by the seed-to-key
block; S(seed, j) denotes the jth dynamic key obtained from
the seed. CNFj is the input to the j + 1th SAT attack run
to produce CNFj+1. Our attack terminates when one of
the SAT attack runs fully resolve the seed with the help of
the CNFs from the prior runs as shown in the flowchart in
Fig. 12.
TABLE 1
ScanSAT on dynamic scan locking for p=1. The seed 00001 is
recovered upon two independent SAT attack runs.
Dynamic key Correct value Recovered key Recovered seed
key1 10000 -00— 00—-
key2 01000 010-0 00001
key3 00100 001– 00001
key4 10010 10010 00001
The number of independent SAT attack runs required to
resolve the secret seed depends on the value of p. For large
values of p, a few SAT attack runs with a large number of
DIPs will be able to resolve the seed, while a small value
of p (frequent key updates) will result in a large number
of SAT attack runs each terminating prematurely with a
small number of DIPs. For t independent SAT attack runs
(or alternatively, t iterations), ScanSAT ends up generating
around t × p DIPs; each iteration except for the last one
terminates with p DIPs, while the last iteration may ter-
minate with fewer than p DIPs. Collectively, the seed will
eventually be identified as the proposed attack is capable
of carrying partial information about the seed from one
independent SAT attack run to the next. Once the seed is
identified, the entire key sequence can be reproduced based
on the polynomial of the LFSR and the p value.
5.3 Example
We now explain the working of our attack on a small
example for the most challenging case of p = 1 in the
dynamic scan obfuscation scheme in [11]; the dynamic key
is updated in every capture cycle, resulting in a different
key for every test pattern, and thus, necessitating that each
independent SAT attack run be executed for only one DIP.
Consider a sequential circuit whose scan chain is locked
with 5 key bits. The five-bit key is dynamically updated for
every pattern based on the seed 00001 loaded on a five-bit
LFSR. Table 1 shows the correct values of the dynamic keys
for four cycles along with how many of these key bits were
recovered in each SAT attack run. The first SAT attack run,
for example, is terminated with a single DIP for the first key;
at that time, two bits of the first key are identified to be 0’s.
The same table also reports the information revealed about
the seed in each cycle; the two recovered bits of the first
dynamic key helps reveal two bits of the seed by solving the
linear equations obtained from the LFSR structure. The next
SAT attack run on the second pattern (and thus, the second
key) helps identify four bits of the second key. Along with
the already identified two seed bits, this new information is
utilized in solving linear equations; all the remaining three
bits of the seed are recovered. Our attack can actually be
terminated successfully at that point, although two more
iterations are shown in the table.
6 SCANSAT ON SCAN COMPRESSION
The modeling equations developed in the previous sections
assume that the DfT structure has no scan compression.
In this section, we elaborate on how ScanSAT attack can
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Fig. 13. (a) Applying scan obfuscation on a compression-based archi-
tecture; compression ratio is 2 and three key-bits are used. (b) Modeling
as a logic locking problem.
be extended to scan architectures with scan compression.
The discussion herein applies to both static and dynamic
scan obfuscation. For simplicity of discussion, and without
loss of generality, we utilize fanout decompression and
XOR compaction as example stimulus decompression and
response compaction, respectively, to explain our attack.
We note that the proposed attack can also be applied for
any other stimulus decompression and response compaction
technique.
With multiple obfuscated scan chains, the same model-
ing technique in Fig. 3 can be applied with no changes. The
resulting equations, though, would be simpler than those
for the single scan chain case, as the cascaded effect of each
key-bit is limited by the depth of the chain where the key-bit
is inserted.
With stimulus decompressor and response compactor
around the obfuscated scan chains, there is one additional
step for ScanSAT modeling; the decompressor and com-
pactor structures need to be instantiated as many times as
the number of scan slices, capturing the decompression into
and compaction of individual slices.4 The modeled circuit
then relates the compressed stimulus to delivered stimulus
and captured response to observed (compacted) response,
both through key-bits.
The scan architecture in Fig. 13 (b) assumed on the circuit
shown in Fig. 3 results in the scan obfuscated architecture in
Fig. 13 (a). In this example, three stimulus bits a25, a14, and
a03 are delivered into the six SFFs in three shift cycles; some
of these stimulus bits are inverted as they pass through the
key gates. Upon capture, the six captured response bits are
compacted into three bits b25, b14, and b03 to be observed
through the Scan-out pin; some of these six bits are inverted
prior to compaction as they pass through the key gates.
Let us assume a combinational decompression that im-
plements a function Dj∈IN(i)(aj) for scan cell i to compute
ai from the compressed scan-in stimulus bits aj . With scan
4. In scan compression, the group of flip-flops that receive their
stimulus in the same shift cycle is referred to as a scan slice. The number
of scan slices is also referred to as the scan depth.
obfuscation in place, the bits delivered into the SFFs in terms
of the scan-in stimulus and the key-bits are as follows:
a
′
i = Dj∈IN(i)(aj)⊕ L(k, i) (6)
The one-to-one correspondence between the scan-in pat-
tern bits and the delivered pattern bits was captured via
Equation 1; this one-to-one correspondence no longer exists
due to scan compression as illustrated by Equation 6. The
end-result is reduced controllability of a
′
, which is expected
due to stimulus decompression.
The delivered pattern a
′
applied on the combinational
circuit produces the response captured in the SFFs b
′
. These
bits pass through key-bit driven key gates prior to com-
paction and being observed as three compacted bits b03, b14,
and b25 in Fig. 13 (a). Let us assume a combinational com-
pactor that implements a function Ci∈IN(j)(b
′
i) to compute
the compacted response bit bj from the captured response
bits b
′
i. The following equations model the obfuscation and
compaction operations:
bj = Ci∈IN(j)(b
′
i ⊕R(k, i)) (7)
The one-to-one correspondence between the captured
response bits and the observed response bits was captured
via Equation 2; this one-to-one correspondence no longer
exists due to response compaction as illustrated by Equation
7. The end result is reduced observability of b
′
, which is
expected due to response compaction.
The ScanSAT modeled circuit for this example that
captures the equations above is provided in Fig. 13 (b).
This modeled circuit shows the fanout decompressor and
the XOR compactor each instantiated three times in order
to model the stimulus decompression into the three slices
and the response compaction of the three slices. The final
modeled circuit in Fig. 13 (b) is again a logic-locked circuit
that has three key-bits, which the attacker can break by
applying the SAT attack. This time, the input patterns a are
compressed scan-in patterns that the attacker applies from
the Scan-in pin of a working chip. The output patterns b are
the compacted response patterns that the attacker collects
from the Scan-out pin of the working chip. The reduced
controllability due to stimulus compression and reduced
observability due to response compaction may reflect into
increased attack difficulty; the computation of the key val-
ues is now subject to these controllability and observability
challenges. The more aggressive the compression ratio, the
more difficult the attack may become.
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
7.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we present the experimental results for the
ScanSAT attack on several circuits locked using static and
dynamic scan obfuscation, with Encrypt Flip-Flop [7], scan
scrambling [13], and DOS [11] used as representative exam-
ples. We implemented Encrypt Flip-Flop5, scan scrambling,
5. While the preliminary version of this work in [1] implemented
Encrypt Flip-Flop as is (static scan locking and logic locking integrated
together), in this paper, we implemented only the static scan locking
part of it for consistency of comparisons. We do have experiments
where static scan locking is coupled with logic locking in this paper
as well.
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TABLE 2
Statistics of the benchmark circuits [26], [28]. The circuits are sorted
based on the number of SFFs.
ISCAS-89\ITC-99 Benchmark
Circuit #SFFs #inputs #outputs #gates
s38584 1426 38 304 19253
s38417 1636 28 106 22179
s35932 1728 35 320 16065
b19 6642 24 30 231320
DOS, and ScanSAT in a Perl framework on the largest four
circuits, i.e., s38584, s38417, s35932, and b19, from ISCAS-
89 [26] and ITC-99 benchmarks [28]. The details of the
benchmark circuits are listed in Table 2. The benchmark
circuits equipped with the full scan infrastructure are locked
using 128-bit scan locking keys.
For launching ScanSAT on the obfuscated scan chains
with compression infrastructure, the SFFs in a design are
configured into 16 scan chains and compression ratios (R) of
1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 are used. All the tests were performed on
Ubuntu virtual machine utilizing one core of Intel i7− 3770
CPU running at 3.40GHz with 10 GB of RAM.
7.2 ScanSAT Attack on Static Scan Obfuscation
ScanSAT attack results on statically obfuscated scan ar-
chitectures with scan compression are listed in Table 3.
ScanSAT is successful in 100% of the cases and retrieves
the correct key value for all the circuits. The vulnerabil-
ity of scan chain obfuscation to the proposed ScanSAT is
demonstrated by the fact that only a few DIPs are required
to unlock the circuits even with a key size of 128. We
attribute this extremely low number of DIPs to the ability
of the proposed modeling to efficiently capture the data
dependencies in the scan chain. As illustrated earlier in
Fig. 8, each key-bit affects (i) the stimulus delivered to a scan
cell to the right of it and (ii) the response collected from a
scan cell to the left of it. Thus, the error introduced by any
incorrect key-bit is expected to have a unique impact, with
the exception of errors being masked during the capture
operation. Easy distinguishability of keys results in a very
effective key pruning via the SAT attack.
The results in Table 3 also confirm that with scan
compression in place, more aggressive compression ratios
generally reflect into increased attack times. The underlying
reason, as mentioned earlier, is the reduced controllability
and observability during the SAT attack.
7.3 ScanSAT on Scan Chain Scrambling
In this section, we present the experimental results for the
ScanSAT attack on circuits locked using scan chain scram-
bling in addition to static scan obfuscation. The correct scan
paths are generated randomly, and then based on those
generated paths, new routing logic is added. The correct key
value is the one that ensures the specified scan paths. The
benchmark circuits equipped with the full scan infrastruc-
ture are scrambled with a fixed key size of 64, and then the
benchmarks are additionally locked using static obfuscation
TABLE 3
ScanSAT attack results on statically obfuscated scan chains with
compression. All benchmarks are locked with a key size of 128 and 16
scan chains are constructed in each design. R = 1 implies that there is
no compression.
Circuit #SFFs Compressionratio (R) #DIPs
Execution
time (s)
s38584 1426
1 1 20
2 1 16
4 1 14
8 1 33
16 1 40
s38417 1636
1 8 30
2 7 40
4 9 65
8 5 74
16 7 701
s35932 1728
1 1 9
2 1 12
4 1 13
8 1 13
16 1 17
b19 6642
1 15 5771
2 19 26726
4 15 28908
8 13 18156
16 12 12496
TABLE 4
ScanSAT attack results on scan chain scrambling with static scan
obfuscation.
Circuit #Scanchains
Scrambling
key
Obfuscation
key
Total
key size #DIPs
Execution
time (s)
s38584 9
0 64 5 41
128 192 2 108
s38417 17
64
0 64 2 27
128 192 6 80
s35932 16
0 64 2 50
128 192 3 78
b19 16
0 64 8 30439
128 192 13 17134
with 128-bit keys. ScanSAT attack results on the scrambled
scan architectures are listed in Table 4. Again, the attack is
successful in 100% of the cases. A scan obfuscation key
of 0 means that the circuit is locked using the scrambling
technique only. The proposed ScanSAT attack is capable of
consistently breaking scan scrambling with or without static
scan locking used in conjunction.
7.4 ScanSAT on Dynamic Scan Obfuscation
We implement the most challenging case of dynamic scan
locking, i.e., for the case p=1; the dynamic keys are updated
in every cycle. We then apply the proposed Scan SAT on
this challenging defense. We report the number of iterations
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Fig. 14. ScanSAT on dynamic scan locking with no compression. Per-
centage of seed recovered in every ScanSAT iteration. In every iteration,
a new dynamic key is active as p=1.
(i.e., the number of independent SAT attack runs), which is
the same as the total number of DIPs generated by ScanSAT,
as one DIP is generated in each iteration (p=1).
7.4.1 Detecting the Key Update Frequency
The first set of experiments were conducted in order to
prove that the key update frequency p can be detected by
repeatedly inserting the same scan-in pattern(s), performing
capture operations, and observing the scan-out pattern(s).
We applied our attack on all the benchmarks. ScanSAT is
successful in 100% of the cases as it retrieves the correct
key update frequency value across all compression ratios.
7.4.2 Retrieving the LFSR Seed
A 128-bit LFSR was modeled as a combinational circuit in
order to obtain the seed-to-key block in our attack. Fig. 14
shows the percentage of seed bits gradually recovered with
each iteration of the proposed ScanSAT attack. We can
observe that it takes only eight iterations for the proposed
attack to break dynamic scan locking even for p=1 to recover
the complete LFSR seed for the b19 benchmark circuit. For
circuits s35932 and s38584, we recover the seed within only
one iteration.
Table 5 presents the number of iterations and time
needed in order to break dynamic scan obfuscation when
scan compression is in place. Comparing the obtained re-
sults again with the results presented in Table 3, it can
be noted that there is no consistent trend in the execution
time required to unlock the circuits that are statically vs
dynamically obfuscated. The reason is that a single SAT
attack run with many DIPs (attack on static scan locking)
is not that different in terms of execution time than multiple
independent SAT attack runs with few DIPs (attack on dy-
namic scan locking) where the CNF is carried over from one
run to the next. Moreover, the number of iterations required
to unlock the s38584 and the s35932 circuits for different
compression ratios is always one, same as in the static scan
locking case, as expected. In all the cases, ScanSAT uses
only a few iterations to break dynamic obfuscation. In
a couple of cases, a few seed bits remain unsolved due to
attack time-out; these are s38417 with a compression ratio
of 4 (2 bits remain unsolved) and b19 with a compression
ratio of 2 (9 bits remain unsolved). We assume these cases
TABLE 5
ScanSAT attack results on dynamically obfuscated scan chains with
compression and p = 1. All benchmarks are locked with a key size of
128 and 16 scan chains are constructed in each design. R = 1 implies
that there is no compression.
Circuit Compressionratio (R)
#Dynamic
key
Seed
recovered
Execution
time (s)
s38584
1 1 128 72
2 1 128 49
4 1 128 73
8 1 128 89
16 1 128 125
s38417
1 3 128 59
2 7 128 231
4 7 126 292
8 5 128 175
16 7 128 836
s35932
1 1 128 17
2 1 128 17
4 1 128 18
8 1 128 48
16 1 128 54
b19
1 8 128 828
2 11 119 2296
4 11 128 2447
8 11 128 4660
16 8 128 10065
to be broken as well, since the remaining bits can easily be
identified via brute-force.
7.5 Scan Chain Obfuscation + Random Logic Locking
We next investigate the difficulty of breaking scan locking
integrated with a combinational logic locking defense, such
as Random Logic Locking (RLL), wherein XOR/XNOR key
gates are inserted at random locations in the combinational
circuit [4]. The circuits with a compression ratio of 16 are
locked using both static and dynamic scan obfuscation with
a key size of 128. An additional RLL layer is integrated
with additional 128 key-bits, locking the circuits with a total
of 256 key-bits. The original SAT attack, when launched
on circuits that are scan-obfuscated and logic-locked,
consistently fails in obtaining the logic locking key; the
DIPs that should be applied to the oracle could not be
applied intact due to the scan obfuscation in place, which
the SAT attack failed to account for in generating its DIPs.
ScanSAT is then launched on the scan-obfuscated and logic-
locked circuits; the results are listed in Table 6. The attack
is 100% successful on all cases again for both static and
dynamic scan obfuscation.
Comparing the obtained results with the results pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 5, it can be noted that the execution
time required to unlock the circuits becomes higher when a
second RLL layer is in place. For the static scan-obfuscated
s35932 circuit, for example, the attack took 1.4× longer time
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TABLE 6
ScanSAT attack results on statically/dynamically obfuscated (128 bits)
scan chains with RLL (128 bits). Compression ratio is 16. Total key size
is 256.
Circuit Static obfuscation Dynamic obfuscation
#DIPs Execution time (s) #Iter Execution time (s)
s38584 20 94 13 554
s38417 49 1927 9 2567
s35932 4 23 3 85
b19 57 70972 9 29969
to terminate compared to when no RLL was integrated; four
DIPs are now utilized by the attack, whereas previously only
one DIP was employed. This can be expected as the key
size is now doubled. We conclude that integration of scan
obfuscation as another layer of defense over a vulnerable
logic locking technique is still vulnerable to ScanSAT for
both static and dynamic scan obfuscation. This confirms
our claim that SAT attack resilient logic locking solutions
are still needed to protect design IP, as one cannot rely on
scan obfuscation to protect logic locking.
8 DISCUSSION
A recent survey paper [29] lists various scan obfusca-
tion/masking defenses. In this section, we categorize these
defenses into three classes as shown in Table 7: (i) RE-
vulnerable: those that are vulnerable to any basic reverse
engineering (RE) attack; e.g., the position of added gates
identified via RE can be used to compromise the de-
fense; ScanSAT does not need to be applied. These are
defenses that are more applicable in threat models where
reverse engineering is considered impractical. (ii) ScanSAT-
vulnerable: those that are vulnerable to our attack ScanSAT.
(iii) ScanSAT-resilient: those that are resilient to our attack
ScanSAT but at the expense of other implications such as
hindered debug, etc. Details about these defenses can be
found in [29].
8.1 ScanSAT versus Scan Attacks
ScanSAT and other oracle-guided attacks assume access
to a reverse-engineered netlist (IP); such a netlist is not
included in the threat model of the scan attacks. As a result,
countermeasures for scan attacks are no longer secure in
the more generous threat model. Certain scan attack coun-
termeasures rely on scan chain authentication [14], [30], [31],
[32]. These countermeasures can be circumvented by having
access to a reverse-engineered netlist, as the on-chip logic
that implements secure scan can also be reverse-engineered
to bypass authentication.
Also, most side-channel attacks rely on operating in
normal/user mode for a few cycles and then switching to
the test mode; the data loaded into the round registers in
the user mode can leak through the SFFs during the test
mode [33]. The Mode-Reset Countermeasure (MRC) resets
all flip-flops upon transition from one mode to the other and
thwarts traditional scan attacks [34]; the countermeasure is
deployed in many Intel chips. MRC provides no protection
against ScanSAT, as ScanSAT operates only in the test
mode.
8.2 Dynamicity of keys
In this paper, we show that ScanSAT can break dynamic
scan obfuscation for p=1. In order to break the improved EFF
scheme in [35], we can tweak our modeling to account for
the dynamicity of the key across shift cycles; then our attack
would be able to retrieve the seed of the LFSR that generates
these keys. Our future research will focus on this more
challenging problem. We also note that significant practical-
ity problems emerge as the key dynamicity becomes more
aggressive; as explained in [11], even small values for p
may not be that practical as test patterns are often post-
processed (addition/removal/reordering of test patterns)
while the dynamic keys are produced in a fixed sequence
by the LFSR. The original dynamic scan obfuscation scheme
in [11] suggests the use of a large enough p that will allow
for the re-use of the same key for the reordered test patterns
within a window of p patterns.
8.3 Limitations of ScanSAT
ScanSAT may fail against Built-in Self Test (BIST) [36] due
to the extremely limited observability; this expectation can
be verified by extrapolating from the data in Tables 3 and 5
for the very large compression ratio of BIST. However, BIST
also inhibits debugging and in-field testing the same way it
inhibits our attack.
Further, ScanSAT can be thwarted by encrypt-
ing/decrypting the stimulus and the response by using
provably secure techniques [37]; but this requires using
dedicated, and thus, costly on-chip cipher blocks. Another
approach would be to utilize PUFs as in [38] at the expense
of reliability concerns associated with PUFs.
Another way to thwart ScanSAT may be to decouple the
LFSR update from the key update in dynamic scan obfusca-
tion. The proposed ScanSAT can model such an operation,
as the structural details of the LFSR (its polynomial) can be
utilized to compute the relationship between the seed and
the produced keys. The attack can still be applied as is and
expected to be effective; from the identified linear equations,
the seed can be computed by accounting for the LFSR
states that are “skipped.” Keying the rate ratio between the
LFSR to key update, however, would significantly hamper
the attack; the exact relationship between the seed and the
dynamic keys would be hidden from the attacker. Future
research is necessary to enhance the proposed ScanSAT to
model the seed to key relationship and circumvent such a
defense.
8.4 Comparison Against NSAA [24]
An orthogonal line of research is an attack that assumes no
scan access [24], herein referred to as NSAA (no scan access
attack). NSAA exercises only the primary inputs (and not
the SFFs) and observes only the primary outputs (and not
the SFFs) of the working chip. In [24], NSAA is reported to
be successful for 80% of the time for a key-size of 32 bits.
Often, the attack can correctly retrieve only a subset of key-
bits. In contrast, ScanSAT works 100% of the time, even on
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TABLE 7
Scan obfuscation/masking defenses
Defense Security
VIm-Scan [14] RE-vulnerable
SSTKR [15] RE-vulnerable
Scan chain authentication [30], [31],
State dependent scan flip-flop based scan (SDSFF) [32] RE-vulnerable
Flipped scan [39], XOR scan [40], double feedback XOR scan [41] RE-vulnerable
Test key integrated scan [42] RE-vulnerable
DOS [11] ScanSAT-vulnerable
EFF [7], improved EFF [35] ScanSAT-vulnerable
Scan scrambling [13] ScanSAT-vulnerable
Mode-reset countermeasure [34] ScanSAT-vulnerable
BIST [36] , scan on-chip comparison [43]/compaction [44],
Secure test wrapper (STW) [45] ScanSAT-resilient
Scan interface encryption [37] ScanSAT-resilient
Bias PUF based scan [38] ScanSAT-resilient
large circuits such as s38584 and b19 (even with a key-size
of 128). For s38584, the only benchmark common to our and
their work, the NSAA tool reportedly crashed [24].
As acknowledged in [24], NSAA is effective only if the
ratio of the primary IOs to the SFFs is reasonably large.
Unfortunately, this ratio is expected to be small for the
realistic circuits as the chip interface (primary IOs) cannot
grow at the same rate as the design complexity (SFFs).
9 CONCLUSION
Obfuscation of scan chains aims to protect against the un-
trusted testers; static and dynamic scan locking techniques
obfuscate the scan operations, hiding the relationship be-
tween the scan-in and the delivered stimuli and the rela-
tionship between the captured and the scan-out responses.
Static scan locking utilizes a single key while dynamic scan
locking keeps updating its key, resulting in a sequence of
keys that obfuscate scan operations.
In this paper, we propose the ScanSAT attack on obfus-
cated scan chains, extracting the secret key (sequence) and
unlocking the circuit/scan chain. The attack is evaluated by
analyzing the security of three representative scan obfusca-
tion techniques–two static and one dynamic–over different
scan chain architectures. ScanSAT models the obfuscated
scan chains as a logic-locked combinational circuit, paving
the way for the application of the powerful SAT attack to
reveal the key (sequence), unlocking the scan chains, and
thus, restoring access to the oracle. We show that ScanSAT
can break naive scan locking techniques even for large key
sizes and when scan compression is in place.
We also show that ScanSAT is capable of breaking com-
pound defenses comprising scan locking and logic locking,
as long as the logic locking defense is vulnerable to SAT at-
tack. We therefore nullify the presumption that scan locking
may protect logic locking by hindering the full scan access
that SAT or other logic locking attacks need; we show that a
logic locking technique that is resilient to SAT attack is still
needed to protect the design IP.
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